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VIEWS ON THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF EcoNoMIcs*
By A. B. Wolfe
Generally speaking, it is a brave man who will permit his old essays
addresses to be dug out of journal files and republished in book
form, with conventional dust jacket and blurb. Bound to seem trite
to the reader who profited by them on their original publication, to
younger readers who now come upon them for the first time they
are likely to seem exercises in intellectual antiquarianism—naive
voices out of a past now gone and vicariously relived only with
effort.1 Nevertheless .these collections should be welcomed. They
'may contain much that is of no current significance, but they also
make available some contributions of permanent, even classic,
value,' which would otherwise be lost. Currently and in after-years
the collected essays of any well-known economist will be valuable
to the student of the history of economic thought, both as docu-
mentary data on the economist's own attitudes and development
ancl as evidences of the intellectual and social interests 'of his time.
This will be especially true in the case of those economists, now
apparently increasing in number, who produce few books (and
those mainly monographic) and no systematic general treatises.
Mitchell is among this number. Amid all his varied activities he
has from the beginning of his career devoted his main energies to
research and the direction of research, and has published his major
*Originallypublished under thetitle "Thoughts 'on Perusal 'of Wesley
Mitchell's Collected Essays," Journal of Political Economy, February 1939.
This review article of The Backward Art of Spending Money and Other Essays
is here reprinted, with only minor changes, by permission of the author and
• publisher.
remarks apply in only limited degree to Mitchell's essays. Only five of'
those reprinted in this collection are of prewar date, and only five more date.
from the predepression 1920's. The remaining seven were published in the
1930's, two as late as 1936.
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contributions as monographic results of his researches.2 His jour-
nal articles, not numerous, represent a minor part of his contribu-
tion to economics.
Aside from his lifelong work on the business cycle, Mitchell has
made few substantive contributions to economic theory, at least
as that term is usually understood. In this volume the only positive
contributions to theory are the paper on "Making Goods and Mak-
ing Money," which shows the influence of Veblen's distinction
between industrial and pecuniary employments, and the on
"The Role of Money in Economic Theory," which has long taken
rank as a classic. Hardly less significant, however, by way of criti-
cal analysis, are "Bentham's Felicific Calculus," "Postulates and
Preconceptions of Ricardian Economics," "Wieser's Theory of
Social Economics," and "Commons on Institutional Economics."
The rest of the essays deal with the nature, function, and method-
ology of economics, conceived of not as an academic discipline but
as a purpOsive social science.
IMITCHELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE NATURE AND METHOD
OF ECONOMICS
In a round-table discussion with Professors Viner, Hollander, and.
E. B. Wilson at the American Economic Association meeting of
1927, Mitchell declared that he did not share the impression that
a controversy over method was impending among American econ-
omists, that he saw "no-need for controversy on the problem of
how to work," and "that we shall let our different predilections
and opinions involve us in a controversy upon methods at large
seems ..almostas improbable as it would be deplorable."3
Again, in his address at the one hundred and seventy-fifth anni-
versary of the founding of Columbia University, he saw "a signifi-
2Asidefrom those monographs of the National Bureau of Economic Research
which embody the results of research which Mitchell either directed or in which
he co-operated, his major publications consist of his two well-known mono-
graphs on the greenbacks (A History of the Greenbacks and Gold, Prices, and
Wages under the Greenback Standard) and his monumental works on the
business cycle (Business Cycles and Business Cycles: The Problem and Its
Setting).
8AmericanEconomic Review, Supplement, March 1928; Essays, p.
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cantsign of the experimental temper of the time" in "the subsid-
ence of controversy about the larger issues of economic theory."4
In the round-table discussion above referred to, he expressed the
conviction that "qualitative and quantitative analysis are becom-
ing so interwoven in economics that it will soon seem pedantic to
question the indispensability of either," and that "one who elabo-
rates statistical series in ingenious ways may get as far out of touch
with reality as one who excogitates a set of speculative assump-
tions." On balance, therefore, Mitchell's present attitude seems to
be one of tolerance toward all methods of analysis, but with the
conviction that "the trend of current work sets strongly in the
direction of. dealing directly with the concrete and the actual rather
than with the abstract and the imaginary."5
Mitchell, however, has not always spoken in quite this concilia-
tory spirit. When assembled under one cover his essays and ad-
dresses are a revelation of the extent to which his thought has been
concerned with the method and purpose of economics, and much
that he has written has been a challenge to methodological con-
troversy. However muchmay decry such controversy, and
however fully we may agree that mere controversy, in contrast to
constructively critical discussion, is usually fruitless, it remains a
fact that the rise and development of Veblenian institutionalism
in this country has been a tremendous stimulus not only to meth-
odological controversy but to re-examination of the nature of
economics and the proper function of the economist.
To the general challenge thrown down by institutionalism
Mitchell has added a specific challenge in his reiterated contention
that scientific economics must be not only empirical but quanti-
tatively or statistically empirical. Whether Mitchell has thought
that the only scientific way of carrying forward and implementing
Veblen's work is by laborious statistical analysis we need not
attempt to say, but it is worthy of remark that in resorting to statis-
tics as the main instrument of economic analysis Mitchell is using
a tool which Veblen rarely used, and is, moreover, sharpening
the probability of methodological dissent. In the main it is to be
feared that the publication of Mitchell's essays in book form is
uite as likely to stir up further discussion on the nature and pur-
'"Economics, 1904-1929," Essays, p. 404. IbId., p. 400.210 A. B. WOLFE
pose of economics as it is to pour oil on troubled waters. It can
hardly be said that belief that controversy over abstract generali-
ties of methodology has happily ceased is well founded. It is true
that such discussions have practically disappeared from American
economic journals—but only to appear in journals of a more
philosophical complexion.
Mitchell's evident belief that deductive analysis is on the wane
must be regarded as wishful thinking, as a survey of the current
English and American economic journals will abundantly prove.
Probably not within the memory of man has as much printer's ink
been spent on pure theory as today. Certainly one of the most
striking features of economic thought at the present time is the
prevalence of sheer mathematical logic without a shred of factual
data. There can be no doubt that this particular approach intrigues
an increasing number of brilliant young It may appeal
to them because it seems to free them frOm the value-judgments
which they associate, rightly or wrongly, with institutional eco-
nomics. Whether it leads only to a blind alley of sterile logic or
will, in spite of its abstruseness and far removal from actualities,
eventually throw a light on fundamental economic realities that
no. amount of statistics or institutional history can throw, time.
only can decide.
Meanwhile we must recognize at once that Mitchell's economic
philosophy is not merely a negative reaction to als ob deduction
and hedonistic assumptions. It is also a highly positive philosophy.
If the present writer has correétly read the pattern of Mitchell's
thought as revealed in these essays and addresses, it is built on the
design of the following basic principles:
1. Rationalistic hedonism as the foundational hypothesis of
economic motivation must be discarded once for all and in its
place be substituted appeal to realistic,, behavioristic, and social
psychology.
2. Deductive theory, especially the als ob theory of the mathe-
matical equilibrium school, can at best give but doubtful and
limited help in understanding the processes of an actual economic
society. /
3.Economics must, be a concrete and realistic study of institu-
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fixed but as continually changing; hence economics is not only an
institutional, but a dynamic and evolutionary, science.
4. Economics is only one of several sciences studying human
behavior; hence we must have far more mutual understanding
and co-operation between the various social sciences than we have
thus far attained.
5. Where the available data make it feasible, the most exact
method of studying economic life is the statistical analysis of mass
behavior.
6. Many productive economic researches are beyond the finan-
resources of individual scholars; hence there is imperative
necessity of well-financed and expertly directed research Organi-
zations.
7. Economics should be a functional science; it has but one
fundamental raison d'être—the furtherance of• economic welfare.
8. Economic planning is inevitable whether we think it feasible
or not. Hence we had better organize to do the job as well as we
can. A properly organized National Economic Council would
perhaps have but modest success in dealing with the more diffi-
cult and important issues, but it would function more construc-
tively than pressure groups or inspirational politicians.
These principles of methodology, point of view, and purpose
are not neatly and symmetrically worked out to a system. A con-
sistent philosophy, to be sure, runs implicitly through the entire
collection of essays, but its ruling principles are nowhere assembled
into an integrated whole. This task is unfortunately left to the
reader. Nevertheless, the conception of the nature. and functiOn
of economic science derived from the above principles gives the
clue to the significance of all that Mitchell has written. In sum-
mary, Mitchell's view is that economics must be not only empirical,
quantitative, institutional (or behavioristic), and realistic, but
purposeful and useful—in short, functional welfare economics.
The basic Criterion of the validity and usefulness of eéonomic
research, in Mitchell's view, is that it shall be realistic. This means
that we must deal with concrete factual data, with as much theory
as is necessary for the clear definition of concepts. It is not the
function of deductive theory to discover problems for empirical
research to work on, butrather the reverse. The main function ofS
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deductive theory in economics seems to lie in the consideration of
problems derived from quantitative data. In any case, deductive
theory has no scientific standing or validity—that is, any verifiable
validity—unless it is combined with empirical tests of the assump-
tions on which it is based or the results at which it arrives. To
the extent that economics permits itself to deal with motives at all,
these motives must be inferred from objective behavior. It is un-
scientific to proceed on hypothetical motives, hedonistic or other-
wise, set up beforehand as a ready-to-wear explanation of objective
behavior. Tied in loosely with these objective and quantitative
criteria is the institutional idea. Mitchell's Veblenian institution-
alism seems to boil down to substantially this: that men in the
mass, at any given time and in any given culture-complex, behave
in certain standardized ways, according to uniform but not simple
patterns; these patterns undergo an evolutionary drift which can
be roughly measured by the statistical device of time series and
which with adequate empirical analysis is amenable to some de-
gree of rational control and direction.
While Mitchell's institutioñalism may be taken as a derivative
and even as a rationalization of his skepticism as to the hedonistic
assumptions and the deductive logic of classical and neoclassical
economics, this need in no way detract from the cogency and
validity of his fundamental views as to the nature and purpose of
economic science or of his faith in the feasibility of rational direc-
tion of economic evolution. Nevertheless, if we wish to evaluate
Mitchell's thought as presented in these essays, we are compelled
to note that he has devoted much space to consistently maintained
attack on deductive theory. It is possible that the uncautious
reader will see in some of Mitchell's animadversions a general re-
jection of theory and all its works. Such interpretation of Mitchell's
position would be erroneous. For he is fully aware of the fact
that we cannot do effective thinking without deductive theo-
rizing, and that many of our working hypotheses come to us in
thatwáy. He makes his attack on certain kinds of deductive theory,
or on theory misused, ortheory attempting to stand by itself
in isolation from the corrective guidance of the facts of the actual
institutional world. In short, what he fundamentally objects to
is the putting forth of principles derived, however logically, fromSCOPE AND METHOD OF ECONOMICS 213
als ob assumptions as an explanation of actual, economic phe-
nomena, and, still more, to the als ob theorist coming down out of
his ivory tower and presuming to give practical advice on the basis
of his hypothetical speculations..
Mitchell more or less implicitly associates deductive theory
with hedonistic postulates. Such. postulates are not logically im-
perative, however, since a logically consistent (non-Euclidean)
system of economic theory could be built up on nonhedonistic
assumptions. The association is natural, however, because all ortho-
dox theory has been 'evolved on some sort of hedonistic assump-.
tion. Practically, also, it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise,
if economics deals with the activities of businessmen and laborers,
•and if hedonism be conceived nOt in the narrow Benthamite sense,
but in terms of seeking satisfiers and avoiding annoyers. Seeking
and avoiding may be calculatingly rational or they may be tropis-
matic and instinctive, impulsive, or culturally patterned habits. It
is the assumption of rational hedonism—the constant, reasoned,
and calculating pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain—to
which Mitchell objects, when it is made the one dominating postu-
late on which understanding of economic behavior is sought.
Mitchell's critical attitude toward deductive economics, like his
institutionalism, was originally derived from the profound influ-
ence of Veblen, whose attack on classical hedonism came at the
time when instinct psychology, which he accepted and built upon,
was in the ascendant. A psychology which finds the springs of
action in instinct, innate tendencies, or natural bents, rather than
•in (or in addition to) rational desire, would appeal to one, like
Veblen, who had had abundant personal occasion to observe the
irrational sentiments, prejudices, and habituations of people. On
the decline of instinct psychology, its successors, behaviorism,
Gestalt psychology, even psychoanalysis, and their related social
psychology, all seem to confirm the idea that human motives must
in their very nature be nonrational, except when they concern
instrumental policy. These psychologies naturally appeal to a Veb-
• lenian institutionalist already convinced of the important role
played by nonrational motivation in the economic as in other
phases of human behavior.
But Veblen's attack on the classical and neoclassical economists214 A. B. WOLFE
was due to more than his rejection of their antiquated psychology.
It was to no small extent due to his contempt for what he regarded
as the stupidity of the orthodox economists of his own generation
in accepting classical principles at face value, as generalizations
definitive, universal, and scientific, instead of what we now recog-
nize them to have been—excogitations, on simplifying assump-
tions, of what ought to of what Veblen sardonically re-
garded them to be, rationalizations and apologies for the status
quo. Here again was thought congenial to Mitchell. True to the
philosophy of the inevitability of evolutionary change, but far from
wanting catastrophic revolution, Mitchell has never evinced any
great faith in the validity of immutable laws or in the practical
utility of hypothetical conclusions derived from als ob logic.
Mitchell's evident feeling that much of our pure economics is
little more than a futile indoor sport is connected with his belief
that economic analysis should provide reliable and useful advice
for the progressive guidance of our economic life. Whether we like
it or not, he implies, our only hope of escaping disaster lies in com-
prehensive, not merely piecemeal, economic planning.6 Little
practical advice, he feels, can be expected, or should be accepted,
from those economists who cultivate abstract (especially mathe-
matical) deductive theory, which in great part does violence to
the complexities, the frictions, and the irrationalities of actual
economic life, and which is built up by a sort of logical positivism
into an ideal, but hypothetical and unreal, system.
Mitchell's critical attitude toward deductive dialectics, on
ground of its practical uselessness, was reflected, as far back as
1922, in his subtly satirical review of F. H. Knight's now classic
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921)Afterremarking that the
distinction between risk and uncertainty is "the chief contribution
which Professor Knight makes to the stock of ideas current in eco-
nomic theory," he adds:
Anyone acquainted with the exposition of economic theory from
Jevons and Clark to .Wicksteed and Schumpeter can forecast the
CSeehis addresses on "The Social Sciences and National Planning" and
"Intelligence and the Guidance of Economic Evolution," Essays, pp. 83-136.
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course of the discussion. ... Ofcourse most of the time-honored issues
of economic theory come up for comment in the course of the journey,
and on each of them the writer has something to say—something
which must be classified and catalogued by the erudite sojourners in
this land of speculation. .. Anyonewho wishes himself to cultivate
pure theory will find here abundant provocation of the sort he likes.
With a little ingenuity he can .make as many occasions for differing
from Knight's "rigorous thinking" (p. vii) as Knight makes for dif-
fering from Clark and Fisher, Fetter and Davenport.
What the relation of economics to psychology should be accord-
ing to Mitchell is not clear. We know that he rejects anything that
smacks of rational hedonism and that he has little patience with
the "American psychological economics" of Fisher and Fetter, by
which, with Commons, he thinks political economy is converted
into countinghouse economics.8 We have his reiterated conviction
that ecOnomics is one of the sciences studying human behavior, but
his positive thought on the psychology of motivation in relation
to the task of economic analysis is somewhat obscure. In some
places he speaks in the spirit of the extreme price economist as if
the analyst is to ignore completely all questions of motive. In 1924
he predicted that "our whole apparatus of reasoning on the basis
of utilities and disutilities, or motives, or choices, in the individual
economy, will drop out of sight in the work of the quantitative
analysts, going the way of the static state." "Motives," he said,
"will not be disregarded, but they will be treated as problems re-
quiring study, instead of being taken for granted as c,nstituting
explanations."° This latter sentence probably represents his cen-
tral thought. Still, we are left in the dark as to what use the econo-
mist is permitted to make of motives even after he has discovered
them through the statistical analysis of mass behavior.
In "The Prospects of Economics" (1924) Mitchell minces no
words in expressing his impression of the bland psychological
ignorance of the orthodox.
$"TheRole of Money in Economic Theory," American Economic Review;
Supplement, March 1916 (Essays, p. 156 if.); John R. Commons, "Political
Economy and Business Economy: Comments on Fisher's Capital and Income,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1907, pp. 120-25.
0"QuantitativeAnalysis in Economic Theory," Essays. pp. 26-27.216 A. B. WOLFE
Our orthodox economists have a most inadequate conception of psy-
chology-_and economics also, for that matter. They write as if the
economist's only concern with psychology lies in the problem of
motive. If pleasure and pain are not the motives of valuation, then
what are the real motives, if any? That is the sole psychological issue
they have grasped. When they pass on from the value problem they
think themselves out of the quagmire .of psychology on firm economic
ground. Obviously this is a grand error.... Noone can lay down
any proposition about business transactions without implying that
men have certain standard ways of feeling, thinking, and acting in
their market dealings with one another,'°
If Mitchell means to say that the economist who wishes to be
realistic and not to base his analysis on the conventional abstrac-
tions of demand-and-supply functions should take pains to find
out how businessmen actually do operate in an actual situation,
no fault need be found.11 But Mitchell does not follow up with a
demand for specific case work of this kind. Instead, he drifts off
into discussion about the need of securing a sounder concept of
economic action by studying patterns of behavior or, in short, what
may be called statistical institutionalism. This leaves the reader
uninformed as to what Mitchell thinks the nature and functions
of the real motives are.
We get some, but not clear, light from a passage in Mitchell's
lông review of 12
To make the defects of the [Austrian] theory as clear as its merits, one
must take the psychological viewpoint in sober earnest—far more
ously than Wieser takes it. Seen from this viewpoint, economics is one
among several sciences dealing with different aspects of human be-
havior....Itsspecial province is the behavior of social groups in
providing the means for attaining their various ends.13
10TheTrend of Economics, p. 16; Essays, pp. 360-61.
Fornumerous unanswered questions for the realistic economist in the field
of businessmen's price policies, see Arthur R. Burns, "The Organization of
Industry and the Theory of Prices," Journal of Political Economy, October
1937, pp. 662-80.
"Wieser's Theory of Social Economics," Political Science Quarterly, March
1911, pp. 95-118; Essays, pp. 225-57. The passage quoted is from the Essays,
pp. 25 3-54.
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Here, obviously, is suggestion that recognition of means-end
relationships is essential to economic theory. But Mitchell con-
tinues:
Now, human behavior can be studied either from outside or from
inside the human being. An economist may observe and record what
men do in business, as a meteorologist observes and records the
weather. An economic historian may study the recorded observations
of others on human behavior, as a geologist studies evidences of for-
mer conditions of the earth's crust. And these objective students may
try to frame illuminating generalizations about human behavior,
without the aid of suppositions concerning human aims. Such work
is as truly part of economic theory from the psychological viewpoint
as is the Austrian analysis. ..Butwork of this objective kind cannot
be done without the statistical and historical apparatus that Wieser
rejects.
In the first paragraph Mitchell recognizes ends, but in the
second defends the strictly behavioristic (objective) method which
avoids questions of human aims—or at least has no working
hypothesis as to what they are. It is a little difficult to see how
welfare economics, which assuredly is without compass or frame
of reference unless it discovers or posits some human aims, can be
much advanced by generalizations, no matter how illuminating
otherwise, which have no reference to the purpose of the human
behavior on which they are made.
There is perhaps no inconsistency in Mitchell's thought here.
One might jump to the conclusion that in 1917 Mitchell had gone
so "behavioristic" that he had no use for ends, aims, motives, or
anything of the kind. Yet in 1924 he talks of "standard ways of
feeling, thinking, and acting."
If we ask what "feeling," whether standardized or not, is about,
we are inevitably led back into the province of want, desire, inter-
est, and the human will, and we are compelled to conclude that
whether the economist infers motives from case studies, statistical
trends, or his own introspection, he cannot get away from them.
The economist can work either from within or from without
consciousness, according to the nature of the problem he has im-
mediately in hand; but if Mitchell, the welfare economist, wants
to know why the price series observed by Mitchell, the statistical218 A. B. WOLFZ
analyst, behave as they do, in order that something may conceiv-
ably be done to make them behave in a way more conducive to
economic welfare, Mitchell, the economist, will have to appeal to
motives whether he is able in some way to infer them from the
price data themselves or whether—as Keynes has got his "liquidity
preference"—he gets them by some unexplained intuition, insight,
or introspective analogy. The main trouble with Mitchell's treat-
ment of motive is not that he is inconsistent but that he is not
clear and explicit on the relation of behavioristic analy-
sis to purposive, or welfare, economics.
It is difficult not to feel that Mitchell, in his repetition of the
dictum that economics must be a behavioristic science, has fallen
victim to the tyranny of words. Merely to say that economics is
one of the sciences that study human behavior may mean any-
thing or nothing. All the social sciences are concerned with be-
havior in one way or another, for behavior is all that men feel,
think, and do. It does not follow, however, that the only way to
study what they feel, think, and do is to take behavior in bundles
of statistical averages. Nor does 'it follow thatwhat Mitchell calls
speculative analysis, based on hypothesis as to the motives opera-
tive in business, may not have a genuine contribution .to make,
even to an economics designed to function in the service of eco-
nomic planning and welfare.
Be that as it may, as late as 1930 Mitchell shows that he can still
make sharply barbed comments on the nonquantitative, abstract,
and hypothetical approach: "Economic theory of the speculative.
kind is as cheap and easy to produce as higher mathematics or
poetry—provided one has the gift. And it has the same problemati-
cal relation to reality as do these products of imagination."14
IIMEANS, ENDS, AND WELFARE ECONOMICS
Mitchell, with Commons, is the leader of the American institu-
tional school; he is an unwavering advocate of the 'statistical
method of studying economic behavior; he is also an avowed wel-
'4"Institutes for Research in the Social Sciences," Journal of Proceedings and
Addresses of the Association of American Universities, 31st Annual Conference,
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fare economist. He refuses to take the "disinterested observer"
pose which is affected by some economists. For him, economics is
far more than an interest and a vehicle for the intellectual but
otherwise purposeless scholar. Indeed, economics in his mind has
a deep moral purpose in that it should provide the understanding.
and insight prerequisite to effective rational control of the eco-
nomic process in the interest of social welfare. But while the object
of purposive economic research and understanding is the further-
ance of welfare, or at least of the elements and conditions which
may be regarded by general consensus as fundamentally essential
to welfare,'5 this object is taken as a matter of course rather than
as matter for discussion. Neither the immediate nor the ultimate
purposes of economic policy must be allowed to bias the interpre-
tation of data or the logic of analysis; nevertheless, implicitly in
Mitchell's mind, all economic research is conducted within the
frame of reference and from the point of view (however distantly
and indirectly) of the general objective of economic organization
and process.
Most economists, being specialists of one sort or another, are
absorbed in instrumental technicalities, but there can be little
doubt that practically all economists will admit that the function
of the economic process is in. last analysis to further some human
end vaguely called welfare, or a little less broadly, economic wel-
fare. But implication that all economists are welfare economists
would be as meaningless as the term welfare itself is when used
without context or definition. The trouble with welfare, or even
with economic welfare, as the general end to be served by eco-
nomic instrumentalities, is that it is little more than a verbal ideal,
an empty box, of no value until given a content.
What to put into this empty box is the crux of the whole funda-
mental means-end problem, not only of economics but of all the
purposive social sciences. For the content of welfare must be values
of some kind—not the rational values of instrumental functions,
but the end values which are the unmediated constituents of what
is nowadays glibly called the "good life." But it is no easier to
define the content of the good life than it is that of welfare. We
have made a mere verbal substitution. Hence, to the scientific
'8Essays, pp. 174-75.220 A. B. WOLFE
economist, who in his philosophy of methodology is commonly
more given to logical absolutes than to pragmatic relativities, wel-
fare is not an empty box. Rather, it is a Pandora's box, full of he
knows not what subjective troubles, and he prefers not to open it.
The avowed welfare economIst, on the other hand, thinks it a
bit illogical to spend all our intellectual energies on consideration
of instrumentalities before we have attempted to reach a tentative
agreement on the ultimate objectives these instrumentalities are to
serve. He thinks it logical to start with the objectives and work
back through the requirements they place on the available means,
to the choice and management of instrumental policies. But he
also recognizes that welfare or the good life is an objective which
cannot be rigidly defined, and, indeed, that it is probably incapable
of definition in purely rational terms.
We are thus on the horns of a distressing dilemma. We may
follow the price economists and the technical experts and concern
ourselves only with immediate instrumentalities, or with mediate
ends which are in turn only means to more distant or more general
objectives, in the blind faith that somebody knows what these
ultimate objectives ought to be, but formally disclaim that it is
any of our concern, as economists, what these ultimates are. Or we
may follow the (presumably less hardboiled) welfare economists
into the uncertain no man's land between ethics and economics,
and try to put a generally acceptable content into the empty box
of we get into difficulties. -
Inlast analysis, ethical norms, ends, values, are matters of feel-
ing. Value-judgments, if they are not judgments simply as to the
appropriateness and efficiency of instrumentalities, are sentiments.
This being the case, it is futile to expect anything like full consen-
sus on the content of welfare. In time, our knowledge of human
physiology may become sufficiently refined, and both knowledge
and insight sufficiently widespread in human society, to afford a
rational basis for consensus on certain general and fundamental
values. But that time is still distant. Meanwhile there is possibly
only a pragmatic escape from the dilemma, and even that is
feasible only within the compass of a given culture. The content of
welfare will have to bejudged by such consensus as there may be
on the. part of the competent leaders in the study of human needs.
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welfare as the end, do not define it. Hobson's organic welfare
would be capable of reasonably objective definition, were the con-
cept limited to the individual human organism, but Hobson gives
it a turn which suggests both the naive organic analogy of Spencer
and the early sociologists and the romanticism of Spann.16
Both involve vicious confusion of means and ends. Pigou is more
chary. He avoids the social organism fallacy. "Welfare includes
states of consciousness only," and these have something to do with
"satisfactions." But Pigou refusesdiscuss the content of welfare
because it would "constitute a task so enormous and complicated
as to be quite impracticable." Furthermore, he limits his thought
to economic welfare, by which he means that phase of welfare
which can be dealt with and measured in pecuniary terms. Need-
less to say, this recourse, while it may be pragmatically the best
course open, does not free us from the problem of consensus.
Mitchell's specific references to welfare are brief and incidental
to other matters, but they indicate that he accepts without quib-
bling certain physical conditions as established fairly definitely by
consensus as essential prerequisites of welfare.
In 1916 he wrote:
Economic life may be regarded. .- asa process of making and spend-
ing money. .. alsoas a process of making efforts and gaining satisfac-
tions.. .finallyas the process by which a community seeks its material
welfare. On this view every person is a contributor to, a burden upon,
or a detractor from the commonweal. .. Suchaccounting as is pos-
sible runs in heightening or lowering the community's vitality.
•.. Itis feasible even now to set up a tentative criterion of economic
welfare, and make investigations into the relations between the vari-
ous features of economic activity as now conducted and welfare as
thus conceived. Such work may have as keen theoretical interest, as
genuine scientific standing, as work that professes to maintain a serene
indifference to the fate of humankind. But its successful prosecution
presupposes considerable knowledge of how economic processes
actually work at present. ...Inthe interests of social welfare itself we
need clearer insight into the industrial process of making goods, the
business process of making money, and the way in which both sets of
activities are related to each other and to the individual's inner life.17
16J. A. Hobson, Work and Wealth (1914), Ch. I;Free-Thoughtin the Social
Sciences (1926), Part II, Ch. IV.
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In 1924 he is more definite as to the content of material welfare:
In becoming consciously a science of human behavior economics will
lay less stress upon wealth and more stress upon welfare. Welfare will
mean not merely an abundant supply of serviceable goods, but also a
satisfactory working life filled with interesting activities. At present
welfare thus conceived is rather vague, but it is capable of being made
objective and definite in reference to such matters as food, clothing,
shelter, sanitation, education, fatigue, leisure. And this realm of the
definite in welfare will be expanded steadily by quantitative methods,
so that we shall develop a criterion of welfare applicable to many lines
of effort.18
It would be unfair to expect or to demand of Mitchell a philo-
sophical essay on the difficulties of the welfare concept, on the
relations between economics and ethics, or on the logic of means
and ends. His mind does not run to abstractions. It is sufficient
that he definitely takes the stand that economics must not only
be realistic but realistic to a purpose—a purpose which he thinks
capable of more definite delineation than the undifferentiated gen-
erality, economic welfare. It is obvious that Mitchell in the above
passage definitely and explicitly recognizes the significance of a
fundamental means-end relation for economics and is not scared
off by an academic fear of value-judgments.
Assuming it possible to entertain realistic hope that within a
given culture reasonable consensus may be attained not only as to
the content of economic welfare but as to whose welfare is to be
subserved by the economic process, it is obvious that an economics
which does not dodge the question of its own purpose by seeking
refuge in monkish seclusion.behind the walls of valueless objectivity
has two tasks to perform.
The first task. is to define, as specifically as circumstances, per-
mit, the content of that part of welfare which is directly correlated
with economic processes. The problem of the content of welfare
is a problem of ends, not of instrumentalities. In the task of defin-
ing this content, it goes without saying, economists cannot and
will not rely entirely or even mainly on their own science. They
must make use of the relevant findings of a 'large number of other
"The Prospects of Economics," in The Trend of Economics, p. 31; Essays,
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sciences. Mitchell, more than most economists, recognizes this, in-
terdependence and continually emphasizes, it. It is regrettable that
economists have generally failed to give more than halfhearted,
attention, at most, to this problem of ends. The reasons for this
failure are fairly obvious. They lie in the prevalent fear of value-
judgments and in the fact that most economists are specialists in
one or another of the various technical and instrumental fields into
which economics 'hasbeen divided, necessarily, but not without
unfortunate loss of integration and perspective.
The second task is the study of instrumentalities. This is the task
to which economics has almost exclusively been devoted. It has
been a task congenial to scientific economists because the ends ordi-
narily considered by the specialist or expert are immediate and
objective and are in fact only intermediate instrumentalities. To,
the expert they are ends pro tern, and he does not bother to think
about ultimate economic objectives. But the fact that he may not
give thought to such objectIves does not mean that he is free from
feelings or sentiments as to what should be the ultimate objective's.
He is no more free of such value-judgments than anyone else. The.
trouble is that he is unlikely to recognize and admit his own senti-
ments. Not all the conspicuous disagreements among specialists
are due solely to differences of logic and reason. Without dwelling
on the broad diversities of sentiment which hide behind the façades
of intellectualistic ideologies—communism, fascism, capItalistic
individualism—it is fairly obvious that even within the somewhat
elastic and changeful ideology of.capitalism differences of expert
opiniOn, for example, on labor policies, on money and credit, and
on effective ways of promoting recovery from depression, may be
in part traceable to differences in sentiment as to what the general
social objective of policy in the,se respective instrumental fields
should be. .
Themain volume of Mitchell's work, and thought has been in
the realm, of instrumentalities. He differs from the general run of
prominent economists in that he definitely brings to our attention,
albeit with touch-and-go brevity, the of ends. He con-
tinuãlly emphasizes the imperative, need of understanding the
working'.of the economic system as it actually is. This means that
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reference, he emphasizes knowledge of instrumentalities, with com-
paratively few explicit and specific references to the end these
instrumentalities are supposed to serve. If he were addressing him.-
self not to professional economists but to the "lo here, lô there"
sentimentalists, or what H. G. Wells calls the "for-God's-sakers,"
his emphasis on factual knowledge would be entirely proper. It
may have some propriety when addressed to the equilibrium econ-
omists if and when they are in danger of forgetting that their
system of thought is idealistic and hypothetical. It certainly has
propriety if addressed to the lay public and to lawmakers who have
a sense of accomplishment when they get a law on the statute
books, whether it can be enforced or not. In other words it points
to the function of practical, pragmatic knowledge. No one who
has his feet on the ground will question the need for such knowl-
edge..
There can be no quarrel with factual knowledge, provided it is
scientific—i.e., organized and integrated—and provided we know
what to do with it, either in aid of understanding or of policy in
action. We here encounter the problem of the frame of reference
of our understanding of facts. There may be more than one frame
of reference. There are at least two in Mitchell's system of thought.
One is derived from Veblen's institutional evolutionism, or is in
fact identical with it. According to this, we understand a social
institution or an economic relation when we have a thorough
knowledge of its historical origins and genetic development. It
then appears as a stage in an evolutionary process and we explain
it as such. If this were all there is to economics, economics would
be a phase of colorless and thoroughly objective institutional his-
tory. Understanding, in this frame of reference, satisfies only what
Veblen called idle curiosity. (It is idle because it has no other
motive than itself—knowledge for the sake of knowledge.) Grant-
ing that idle curiosity may be a sufficient and sustained motive to
an adult, intelligent, and integrated man; there is nothing illogical
in its systematized results. The fact that Veblen's •"disinterested
observer" attitude was a satirical pose which deceived no one, and
which he meant to deceive no one, should not lead us to deny the
logical validity of such a frame of reference.
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Mitchell. It is that of the meaning or function of factual know!-
edge in reference to the direction and control of the stream of
institutional evolution. Whether such a desire be proper in the
scientist or not, both Mitchell and Veblen desire to control the
course of economic change. The motive is now not idle curiosity
but the "instinct of workmanship." And from this point of view,
understanding is something more than hindsight or knowing the
genetic causation of things. It now takes on the complexion of
foresight or a certain teleological character. -
Theissue, therefore, involves no questioning of our need of fac-
tual knowledge. It lies in the significance or meaning of the know!-
edge we have or can get. And in this frame of reference meaning
has an instrumental or value complexion. For all welfare econo-
mists, and specifically for Mitchell—who holds that "in economics,
as in other sciences, we desire knowledge mainly as an instrument
of control"19—the meaning of meaning must lie in the sphere of
values. It must have some reference to the ends or objectives tà
the attainment of which economic instrumentalities arid policies
are to be directed. Unfortunately, Mitchell, like most economists,
nowhere brings out clearly the significance of the means-endrela-
tion for ecOnomic analysis, and especially for a purposive eco-
nomics, and his thought seems to vacillate between the idle-
curiosity and the instinct-of-workmanship frames of reference. In
his brief references to welfare, and less definitely in the addresses
in which he argues the necessity for national planning and advo-
catès the establishment of a National Economic Council,2° he has
ends explicitly in view; but in most of his other essays, ends are
only implicit. They lie darkly in the background while the discus-
sion proceeds On lines either of institutional description or of poli-
cies and instrumentalities the objective of which is rather taken
for granted than definitely held in view.
There is no reason to think that Mitchell would question that
from the standpoint of an instrumental or purposive economics
"understanding" or "insight" must have to do with the instrumen-
'°"TheProspects of Economics," in The Trend of Economics, p. 25; Essays,
p. 372.
20"TheSocial Sciences and National Planning," Essays, pp. 83-102; "Intelli-
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tal relations of the economic process to the ultimate function—
economic welfare—of that process, but he leaves this connection
too much to the reader's intuition; and he does not guard against
the tendency of the economic specialists to hypostatize means into
ends.
Veblen rejected classical economics because he thought that it
did not furnish genuine knowledge as to how the economic system
actually works. Mitchell. repeatedly emphasizes the primacy of fac-
tual research because he too wants to know how the system works.
But the question "How does it work?" connotes a means-end rela-
tion. It is plausible to say that we should know how the present
system works before we indulge in too much wishful thinking as
to how it' should work or embark on ambitious schemes of eco-
nomic planning; but insight into the working of the system is not
as simple as this statement implies. Understanding of a system èan
be derived from description only if the description iá selective and
made from the frame of reference of the function of the system.
In economics, as in the other social sciences, mere description of
mechanical relations and narrative of time 'sequences,matter
how elaborate or how much facilitated by statistical techniques, is
meaningless. The working either of a machine or of a social system
can be understood only with reference to,what the machine or the
system is supposed to do.
Consequently no economist who thinks of himself as anything
•more than an instrumental specialist or mere dilettante' can be
excused from the duty of• thinking' in terms of ends as well as
means, of function as well as structure. If we are 'to discover how
•an instrument works, if we are to measure its efficiencies and in-
efficiencies, we must have some standard or least
sme approximate idea—of its function or purpose, which will in
some sense define its ideal efficiency We must also have an ideal
of the purpose of the system. This ideal purpose is in last analysis
a value, an interest, and consequently any economic theory which
is avowedly (as welfare economics must be) purposive and teleo-
logical is founded in part on fundamental value-judgments. The
ideal process functionally suitable to the realization of these ideal
values will never actually be attained but it will take form in, men's
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identical ideal types of instrumental process, partly because no
two will precisely agree in their ideal ends or their conception of
economic welfare. Coqsequently both the ideal end and the ideal
type of economy will vary somewhat, both with changing culture
and with individual sentiment. The question, therefore, is whether
there is an ideal. end of sufficient objectivity and one on which
there is sufficient pragmatic agreement or consensus to warrant its
as a criterion of the actual working of any existing economy.
There is a fundamental and inescapable element of teleology
both in machine design and in economics. No one designs a pur-
poseless machine and no one, really, is interested in a purposeless
economy. The signal difference between machine designing and
economic planning is that the end' in the former is objective, defi-
nite, and not a matter of sentiment, while in the latter the end
can be formulated only provisionally and pragmatically, within
the limits of a consensus of value-judgment which is never univer-
sal. If attempt be made to state the end in terms of welfare, or the
"good life," we are thrown into a subjective realm in which, in the
last analysis, whatever consensus there may be as to the ideal type
must be consensus of feeling and sentiment. Welfare economists
will do well, therefore, to restrict their teleological ideal to eco-
nomic welfare, and to confine their study of means-end correla-
tions to the relations between economic processes and the standard
of living.
To this it may be cogently objected that there is no certain and,
constant correlation between a high standard of living and welfare
in the moral or aesthetic sense of "the good life." Such objection
has point where, as is unfortunately too commonly the case, the
term "standard of living" is taken to mean a consumption standard
measured in the amount of goods and services consumed. But to
think of the standard of living exclusively in terms of
is shortsighted. For, assuredly, what men and women get out of
the economic instrumentalities of welfare is not merely what these
instrumentalities afførd them .foi consumption, but what they
afford them to do—and to do not merely in their leisure time, but
in their working hours. Mitchell, in the passage above quoted
(p. 222), is one of the ,few economists who have made "a satisfac-
tory life filled with interesting activities" an explicit and• 228 A. B.
important element in welfare' and by implication in the standard
of living. A high consumption standard of living can be purchased
at too high a cost—cost in terms not only galling or dead-
ening to the human spirit, but in terms of mortality, morbidity,.
fatigue, and loss of leisure arid liberty.
Here again we encounter relativities, for what is too high a cost
may be a matter of scientific finding—e.g., in the case of fatigue—
or it may be a matter of social conventions or even of individual
whim, especiallythe valuation set on leisure and in the kind of
work one finds interesting. Nevertheless, it seems fairly obvious
that an adequate and well-balanced, concept of the economic
standard of living must be framed in the dual terms of income and
cost of income. On its cost side, the attainable standard of living is
definable only in terms of the limitation of the cost which the
people are willing to incur 'in order, within these limits, to maxi-
mize their income. This means that certain institutionalized cus-
toms or regulations, as to the length of the working day, the num-
ber of rest days, the intensity of work, and legal or conventional
rules as to who shall work and who shall not work, must be
assumed.
With these provisos in mind, it is safe to assume that the per
capita consumption standard of living, the level of per capita con-
sumption income, is directly' correlated with technological and
organizational efficiency of the total economy, and that the en-
hancement of economic welfare will find its ideal limit in the (con-
tinuous) maximization of the output of consumption goods and
services. Consequently, the rational ideal end for the economic-
welfare economist—the maximization of material welfare—gives
him also the rational ideal of the use of economic instrumentali-
ties. This ideal is the maximization of the per capita output of
consumption goods by the utilization of economic resources (within
the institutional restrictions above mentioned) as fully and effec-
tively as possible. These resources include technological knowledge
and aptitudes, natural resourccs, labor power, material capital,
and organizational capacity.
The ideal of maximizing the income producible with given re-
sources is merely a theoretical application of the principle of least
means. There is nothing arbitrary, ethical, or subjective about it..
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It is an ideal or norm implicit in the conception "economy." With-
out it, economy is meaningless. One signal difference between the
economist and the fanciful utopian is that the former knows, and
the latter does not, that the future of the standard of living (eco-
nomic welfare) is limited by the future organization of production
(including the reactions of distribution on production) and by the
productive resources available in the future. These set the limit
beyond which at any given time and in any given state of the arts
maximization of per capita income cannot go, even in the state of
ideal economic equilibrium, in which, theoretically, all productive
resources that can be used are used where they will be most
productive.
This long discussion of the means-end relation, and especially
of the necessity of defining the end, is not a gratuitous digression.
We all, with Mitchell, want to know how the economic system
works. That means that we wish to know how and in what meas-
ure it serves the end for which it exists. To avoid at least, the major
difficulties involved in the general welfare concept, we have to
define the end in terms of economic welfare or the material stand-
ard of living. So defining it, we are in position, theoretically at
least, to compare efficiency with ideal efficiency; and we
find the standard of ideal efficiency just in that ideal economic
equilibrium, or balanced economic society, in the theory of which
Mitchell appears to see little value for a purposive economics.
•The factual knowledge of evolutionary institutional history and
the intricacies of post hoc statistical correlations may give us a
reasonably accurate picture of the road we have traveled up to
the present moment; they may be of some service in enabling us
to predict, with some slight measure of probability, where we are
going from here (though in the present state of civilization this is
doUbtful) ;21 they may even show us here and there what we must
avoid doing if we wish tO progress toward the maximization goal
of social economy; but it is difficult to see how they can be the
positive guide we need. If there is any rationale at all in the eco-
nomic process, positive guidance can be found, if at all, mainly,
John R. Commons, in "Capacity to Produce, Consume, Pay Debts" (Ameri-
can Economic Review, December 1937), offers some pertinent remarks in this
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if not solely, in the logic of economy itself—in the least-cost prin-
ciple which is the foundation of the theory of total-equilibrium
economy.
Even the institutionalist should recognize that there is a theo-
retical, logical upper limit (not indeed fixed, except for the heu-
ristic purposes of analytical understanding) beyond which,
given resources,, even the most perfect economy could not raise the
standard of living. It is perhaps a matter of indifference whether
we think of this limit as a limit fixed by natural law or one fixed
by the inherent logic of economy and efficiency.. The difference is
only verbal. But there is some danger that institutionalists (not
Mitchell) may, in their breadth of view, drift into the vagaries of
romanticism or into the intuitionism of Geisteswissenschaft, and
that as welfare economists they may be so impressed.with the de-
fects of the existing economy that they will not keep their feet on
the ground by getting in mind and keeping in mind the logical
limits of any economy. Of course, it may be answered to this that
the present system is afflicted with so many and suéh glaring ills
that we should proceed to apply remedies without bothering about
concepts of normal or perfect health. Within limits this argument
is valid, but it breaks down where really fundamental reforms are
proposed or where the long-run effects of changes in fundamental
policies are to be considered. Pragmatic temporizing is especially
inadequate, and may be dangerous and injurious, if and when we
venture to embark on the comprehensive economic planning which
Mitchell advocates.
IIITHE PLACE OF THE THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM IN A
PURPOSIVE ECONOMICS
The theory of economic equilibrium, whatever else it may be, Is
essentially the theory of ideal economy in the distribution (or
•apportionment) and utilization of productive resources. Some
equilibrium theorists are loath to admit the ideal character of their
analyses, but in this they are shortsighted, for it is only in its ideal-
ism, its concern with the perfect ideal type of organization and
process, that deductive equilibrium analysis has any reality. The
fact that equilibrium theory is usually based on assumption of
— ISCOPE AND METHOD OF ECONOMICS 231
complete free competition is beside the point. Free competition is
only one condition on which an ideal economy might rest. An
alternative condition would be perfect economic planning and
control. The essential point is that under either ideal competition
or ideal planning productive resources would be so organized, dis-
tributed, and proportioned that the production of consumption.
goods and services would be maximized and stabilized.
Mitchell is critical of the classical type of deductive economic
theory because he thinks its basic psychological assumption—
hedonism—is wholly unreal. Granting that the assumption of the
rational pursuit of gain is a simplifying assumption, one may ask
whether it does great violence to reality. After all, the assumption
is merely that businessmen—and laborers too—do seek to maxi-
mize their net income and seek to do so rationally, the scope
of their knowledge, power, and understanding. No one has yet
demonstrated that the desire for gain (whether in terms of money
or of power) has not always been and still is overwhelmingly the
main motive of business. Of course there are other motives—
social, moral, and aesthetic—actuating the average human indi-
vidual. To some of these the economic motive is a means. Man
shall not live by bread alone, but a modicum of daily bread is pre-
requisite to whatever else he lives by. And some of the other mo-
tives which are adduced by the sociologists in supposed disproof
of the primacy of the economic motive are in their nature essen-
tially institutionalized or moral restrictions on the free operation of
the economic interest. Viewing economic life and the market place
historically and at large, one may be pardoned for thinking it an
open question whether the convention of fair dealing (for exam-
pie) has been evolved more from some inner moral sense than
from the selfish and materialistic motives of the market itself. In
this region of motives Mitchell is a poor guide. Demanding real-
ism, he rejects hedonistic postulates, but gives us nothing very defi-
nite or very convincing in their stead. We may give heed to
his admonition to study modern psychology, yet we may doubt
whether psychology, however modern, has much to offer the econ-
omist. If we wish insight into the legal, customary, and conven-
tional (that is, the institutional) frame within which the operation
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less effectively) confined, we must turn to a work like Commons'
Institutional Economics, where in spite of some juggling with cate-
gories we get realistic analysis of the bargaining process.
The unrealityof deductive analysis lies far less in its hedonistic
postulate than in its unavoidable drastic simplification of data, or
rather of premises. The number of variables is so great and, ac-
cording to alternative assumptions as to the nature and force of
even the most important variables, the number of possible or even
probable cases so large, that any but fragmentary analysis becomes
a bewildering assembly of "ifs." One fruitful source of misunder-
standing among theorists is that it is humanly impracticable ex-
plicitly to state all the assumptions back of the "if." The necessity
of simplifying by impounding masses of variables in ceteris paribus
is, to the present writer's way of thinking, the most serious criticism
that can be brought against the deductive method. Nevertheless,
such alternative impounding is a rational device for getting down
to the essentials of a complex situation, and this method has, at
least theoretically, the advantage that all conceivable combinations
of variables can be studied, and of these cornbinationsthose most
likely to be met with in actual economic life can be singled out for
testing by experience. Whereas the inductive method, attempting
to deal realistically with the puzzling and intricate complexities of
the actual situation, is quite likely to fail to distinguish the primary
from the secondary and relatively unimportant forces.
It would be well for both the institutionalists and the deductive
•equilibrium (and disequilibrium) theorists to lay aside the "either
• ..
.or"attitude and give a little more sustained and serious thought
to their respective frames of reference. Put briefly, the function of
the deductive theorist is to work out the logical results of the eco-
nomic motive; the function of the institutionalist is to analyze the
effect of institutional controls in either restricting or promoting
the operation of the economic motive. It is impossible to work out
a logical theory either of equilibrium or disequilibrium without
some institutional assumptions. Unfortunately, the deductive theo-
rists rarely state what their institutional assumptions are.
other hand, there is possibly a tendency (somewhat evident in
Mitchell) on the part of institutionalists to emphasize the institu-
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to lose sight of the configuration of the process within that frame.
We can accordingly hardly award the palm of realism to the insti-
tutional economists; to study the frame and slight the picture in
it is hardly realism. Nor can any deductive theorist lay claim to
realism in other than a logical sense. All general, abstract economic
theory is als ob theory. As Mitchell says, "Orthodox economic
theory, particularly in the most clarified recent types, is not so
much an account of how men do behave as an account of how they
would behave if they followed out in practice the logic of the
money economy."
In this particular passage, in contrast to some others, Mitchell
gives the devil his due, for he goes on to say:
The better orientation we are getting will not lead economists to
neglect pecuniary logic as a sterile or an exhausted field. On the con-
trary,. not only will it make clear the limitations of the older work,
but it will also show how the old inquiries may be carried further, and
how they may be fitted into a comprehensive study of economic
behavior.22
It is regrettable that Mitchell has not been interested in carrying
this thought farther and in showing how deductive analysis and
empirical institutional analysis can be made mutually fruitfuL It
would seem that the most promising basis for co-operation between
the two methods lies not in insisting that economics must be a
behavioristic science, but in admitting that it is a purposive science.
Once economists regard their science as purposive, the impor-
tance of recognition and analysis of means-end relations becomes
obvious. Consistent attention to these relations will lead to some
re-examination of the meaning of "economy," and the criterion of
perfect economy as the maximization of per capita, real income
will be thrown ihto the high relief it should have. It may be that
then even institutional economists will conclude that the classical
writers and the mathematical economists have built better than
they knew, and that deductive analysis of equilibrium economy is
after all something more than a useless intellectual diversion; for
the analysis of the utilization of scarce means for the purpose of
maximizing income, so far as is technologically, institutionally,
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and humanly possible, will be seen to involve approach to eco-
nomic equilibrium (or a balanced economy). From this point of
view and approach, economic theory will become essentially a
theory of social production. Valuation and distribution, will fall
into their logical place as the process by which productive re-
sources, via the technological significance of factoral proportion
and the conceptual ideal of margins of utilization, are economically
allotted to their alternative and competing uses, in the interest of
high efficiency as judged by the input-output, or the cost-income,
ratio.
But the theory of economic equilibrium, even when set in this
teleological, social, and efficiency frame of reference, will be only
the starting point for a functional economic theory. In other
words, the theory of ideal equilibrium is useful only for heuristic
purposes—more specifically, as a compass which will enable the
purposeful theorist to keep to his. bearings. While the ultimate
ideal goal of purposive economics is the perfectly balanced econ-
omy, all the intermediate instrumental problems of economics
are problems of dynamic disequilibrium. In effect, therefore, eco-
nomics is a trouble-shooting science. Inductive, and statistical,
analysis is an indispensable aid in this process, but it cannot be
the only or the basic guide, since there is no reason to suppose that
empirical statistics alone will enable us to stick to the main line
staked out for us by the theory of equilibrium. That theory in
itself is not enough, however. It is indispensable as a delineation
of the structure of ideal economy; and hence as a criterion of what
the rational direction of dynamic movements should be, but it
does not of itself analyze these dynamic movements. Understand-
ing in this dynamic realm will be immensely furthered by als ob
deductive analysis of the logic of movement from one (assumed)
equilibrium to another, under the impact of certain assumed
changes, such as a change in the rate of investment, a technologi-
change resulting in a given reduction in unit costs, a change in
the relative available supplies of productive factors, and so on.
The central interest of economic theory today is along these lines.
The amount of deductive analysis now being devoted to them is
impressive. Not all of it will be found valid or fruitful, but it will
lead the way which empirical statistical analysis will have to follow.